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One of the key concerns, evidenced from South Africa’s socio-economic rights
jurisprudence, that has impacted negatively on the realisation of socio-economic
rights in the country, especially at grass roots level, has been the inability or limited
opportunities for participation of, and reasonable engagement with, a majority of the
population in decision making processes of government and in the provision of
services. More often than not, government officials have assimilated the Apartheid
system where decisions are made in a centralised bureaucracy without involving
local people. This is despite the Constitution’s contemplation of a participatory
democracy that is accountable, transparent, responsive and open and makes
provision for the participation of society in decision-making processes. In 2009, the
South African Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs
initiated a national assessment of local government to determine the extent of
problems in relation to service delivery. Some of the problems identified included a
break-down of local democracy, poor communication and accountability
relationships with communities, weak community participation, and community
alienation caused by insufficient attention to ‘bottom-up’ planning and consultative
processes.1 In addition, based on research conducted in an informal settlement in
Cape Town, South Africa, Lemanski attributes the failures of both government and
market interventions to address local level poverty largely to the exclusion of poor
people from projects and planning.2 In addition, Williams writes that community
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1Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs State of Local Government in South
Africa: Overview Report (2009) 4, 72 and 73.
2Lemanski ‘Houses without community: Problems of community (in)capacity in Cape Town, South
Africa’ (2008) 20 Environment and Urbanization 393 at 393.
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participation in post-apartheid South Africa is largely spectator politics with
communities becoming endorsers of pre-designed planning programmes.3 There
is, therefore, a need to promote the effective participation of communities in the
service delivery processes of government in line with the tenets of participatory
democracy. This should be promoted not just as a legal requirement or a means to
an end, but as something more substantial – as a fundamental right,4 an important
component of South Africa’s democracy (explained subsequently), and as an
important notion in relation to the upliftment and empowerment of the poor.
Meaningful engagement is thus an important development in the South African
Constitutional Court’s approach to enforcing socio-economic rights and fostering
effective participation in service provision. It has featured prominently in recent
decisions of South African courts – the Constitutional Court in particular – as a
process through which substantive entitlements can be defined and implemented
for specific groups of people. Broadly speaking, as explained elsewhere,
meaningful engagement occurs when communities or individuals and the
government talk and listen to each other, in order to achieve certain objectives. The
objective of any engagement is context sensitive. Put differently, meaningful
engagement requires the state to pay particular attention to its constitutional
responsibilities when it develops policies and programmes and in the provision of
services, and to effectively seek and consider the views of beneficiaries. It is thus
a neutral space where people and the state can discuss and shape options and
solutions to difficult issues.5 Meaningful engagement is more democratic and more
flexible and responsive to the practical concerns that socio-economic rights raise.
By providing individuals and communities with an opportunity to influence the
development and implementation of socio-economic policies and programmes,
meaningful engagement would ensure that they are active stakeholders rather than
just passive recipients of socio-economic goods and services.
In order to understand what meaningful engagement is and is not, the
concept needs to be distinguished from other concepts such as participation,
consultation and mediation. Though it is, at first glance, similar to these concepts,
meaningful engagement as developed by the Constitutional Court goes beyond
mere participation, consultation or the right to be heard. 
Generally speaking, engagement and participation are both processes
through which individuals and communities influence policy-making, priority
3Williams ‘Community participation: Lessons from post-apartheid South Africa’ (2006) 27 Policy
Studies 197 at 197. 
4The right of participation is implicit in the South African Constitution, as it is derived from various
constitutional provisions that speak to participation. See, eg, s 152 and s 195 of the Constitution.
Also, constitutional rights such as freedom of expression, access to information and just
administrative action are important to enable, support and strengthen participation.
5Chenwi and Tissington Engaging meaningfully with government on socio-economic rights: A focus
on the right to housing (2010) 9. 
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setting and access to goods and services, amongst others. However, it is possible
to participate in policy development and implementation without being engaged.
Participation is thus used in this article in conjunction with qualifications such as
‘effective’, ‘full’ and ‘active’, implying that participation between the state and
individuals or communities must fulfil certain criteria (for example, those stated by
the Constitutional Court later in this article in relation to meaningful engagement)
in order for it to be considered ‘meaningful’ or ‘effective’. Meaningful engagement
thus goes beyond mere participation. It recognises the core importance of
fostering active participation and gives content to the right of participation of the
poor while embracing other democratic principles such as transparency and
accountability. It is therefore capable of promoting social change on the ground
as it creates a voice for the marginalised and impoverished. 
Furthermore, as stated elsewhere, though similar in some respects, there are
also basic differences between meaningful engagement, consultation and
mediation.6 Consultation is usually a condition precedent to one discrete decision
at one given moment. It is usually a procedural step necessary to make a decision.
It is, therefore, more an act than a process. Engagement on the other hand, refers
to a process of constant interchange between citizens and the state in the design
and implementation of a socio-economic programme affecting a particular
community or group of people. It is accordingly not simply an act necessary prior to
taking a valid legal decision; it is a practice constitutive of a range of decisions
necessary to design and implement a socio-economic programme. It is, however,
important to note that some consultations can amount to meaningful engagement
depending on the nature of the process and if it is genuine. As a result, international
law, as seen below, emphasises ‘genuine’ consultation, which goes beyond mere
consultation or audi alteram partem (that is, the right to be heard), and involves the
fostering of a long-term relationship between the state and citizens or non-citizens.
The use of the qualification ‘genuine’ is seen to imply meaningful consultation.
Mediation, on the other hand, is a process in which parties in conflict voluntarily
enlist the services of an acceptable third party (a ‘mediator’) to assist them in
reaching agreement on issues that divide them.7 Like mediation, engagement is
also an alternative form of resolving a dispute and a means of involving those
whose rights have been violated in the formulation of a remedy. At times, the courts
have used engagement, consultation and mediation interchangeably, that is,
substituting one for the other. 
This article examines the concept of meaningful engagement as developed
by the courts and the obligations of the state in the engagement process.
6Id 10. 
7The Constitutional Court, as seen subsequently, has encouraged interested civil society
organisations to get involved as third parties in the engagement process, and acknowledges that
skilled and sympathetic people are needed in order for the process to be effective. For further
reading on mediation, see Nupen ‘Mediation’ in Pretorius (ed) Dispute resolution (1993) 39.
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Meaningful engagement has been dealt with mostly in cases involving housing
rights. The article thus focuses largely on these cases but also highlights other
cases in which the concept has been considered. The article also considers how
the concept fits within the constitutional and socio-economic rights legislative
frameworks (specifically in the area of housing and local government) as well as
the international human rights framework. In considering the engagement cases,
the article highlights key principles or points from the judgments that are relevant
in making engagement more effective in the realisation of the socio-economic
rights of the poor. 
It is important to note that meaningful engagement is not only required in
relation to the realisation of socio-economic rights or in the conceptualisation of
legislative and other measures aimed at the progressive realisation of these
rights. It is also a remedial model. While emphasising the need for meaningful
engagement in the realisation of socio-economic rights, the South African
Constitutional Court has also developed it as a remedy in cases where socio-
economic rights have been infringed or are threatened. These two approaches to
the use of meaningful engagement should thus be distinguished. While the first
approach is illustrated in this article, the housing rights jurisprudence considered
alludes to the remedial context, where meaningful engagement has been
triggered by plans to evict.
2 Legal basis of meaningful engagement
2.1 Relevant international law and meaningful engagement
Generally, South African courts have considered international law in their rulings
in socio-economic rights cases.8 While the Constitutional Court has considered
international law and standards in some of its socio-economic rights rulings9 in
two of the cases in which it further developed the concept of meaningful
engagement, the Court did not consider international law. Notwithstanding this
omission, it is vital, and considering the importance attached to international law
in the Constitution,10 to understand how meaningful engagement fits within the
international human rights framework. This would also be useful in a
8How, and instances where, the courts have considered international law in socio-economic rights
cases has been considered quite comprehensively in Kapindu From the global to the local: The role
of international law in the enforcement of socio-economic rights in South Africa Socio-Economic
Rights Project Research Series 6 (2009) http://www.communitylawcentre.org.za/clc-projects/socio-
economic-rights/research-series.
9See, eg, Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2000 11 BCLR 1169 (CC) para
26 (hereafter Grootboom), where the Court examined the relevant provision in the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights vis-à-vis the Constitution. The Court also
explained the importance of international law and standards (both binding and non-binding) in the
interpretation of the rights in the Constitution.
10See, eg, s 39 of the Constitution.
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determination of whether the national jurisprudence is developing in harmony with
international human rights law. This article does not, however, delve into this
determination.
A number of international standards require engagement with right holders
or communities in the realisation of socio-economic rights. This section focuses
on standards at the United Nations (UN) and African regional levels. The general
comments of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR)
in relation to housing, social security, health, water and work, for instance, are
instructive in this regard. The terminology ‘genuine consultation’ is employed in
most of the standards; while others refer to effective participation in decision
making processes. 
In relation to the right to adequate housing and in respect of proposed
evictions and proposed resettlement, international law requires (extensive)
genuine consultation in which representations from affected persons and
communities are invited and considered. The procedural protections which should
be applied in relation to evictions include an opportunity for genuine consultation
with those affected, as stated by the CESCR.11 Also, the UN Sub-Commission on
the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities has urged
governments to ensure that there is effective participation, consultation and
negotiation with the affected persons or groups when adopting measures to give
full protection against unreasonable eviction.12 In addition, the UN ‘Basic
Principles and Guidelines on Development-Based Evictions and Displacement’
(UN Basic Principles and Guidelines) state that:
All potentially affected groups and persons, including women, indigenous peoples
and persons with disabilities, as well as others working on behalf of the affected,
have the right to relevant information, full consultation and participation throughout
the entire process, and to propose alternatives that authorities should duly
consider.13
Most importantly, special measures may need to be taken to ensure that all
affected persons, including women and vulnerable and marginalised groups, are
included in the consultation process.14 Furthermore, elements that must be built
into development processes that may result in the displacement of people from
their homes as stipulated in the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines include:
public hearings on the proposed plans and alternatives; effective dissemination
by the authorities of relevant information in advance; a reasonable period for
11See CESCR General Comment no 4 The right to adequate housing 1991-12-13, UN doc E/1992/2
paras 8(a) and 12; CESCR General Comment no 7 The right to adequate housing: Forced evictions
1997-05-20, UN doc E/1998/22 paras 13 and 15. 
12UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities Resolution
1997/6 on forced evictions, 1997-08-22 para 3.
13Contained in UN doc A/HRC/4/18, 2007-02-05 (Annex 1) para 38 (emphasis added).
14UN doc A/HRC/4/18 para 39 (emphasis added).
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public review of, comment on, and/or objection to the proposed plan; opportunities
and efforts to facilitate the provision of legal, technical and other advice to affected
persons about their rights and options; and the holding of public hearing(s) that
provide(s) affected persons and their advocates with opportunities to challenge
the eviction decision and/or to present alternative proposals and to articulate their
demands and development priorities.15 
Genuine consultation has also been emphasised in relation to the right to social
security and water. The CESCR has stated that an opportunity for genuine
consultation with those affected, and timely and full disclosure of information on
proposed measures are among the procedural protections to be applied before any
action that interferes with the rights of an individual to social security and to water,
is carried out by the state or by any other third party.16 The CESCR has further stated
that the right of individuals and groups to participate in decision-making processes,
must be an integral component of any policy, programme or strategy developed to
discharge governmental obligations in relation to the rights to health, water and
work.17 This includes effective involvement of communities in the definition of
priorities, decision-making, planning, implementation and evaluation of the strategy.18
International law further emphasises the right of specific vulnerable groups
to participate in policy development and implementation. Article 14 of the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,
1979 (CEDAW) guarantees women’s right to participate on an equal basis in
development planning at all levels. The CESCR has further reiterated the right of
the elderly to take part in formulating and implementing policies that directly affect
their well- being.19
At the African regional level, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’
Rights has also placed emphasis on meaningful engagement in the realisation of
socio-economic rights. The Commission has observed that articles 16 (the right
to enjoy the best attainable state of physical and mental health) and 24 (the right
15UN doc A/HRC/4/18 para 37.
16CESCR General Comment no 19 The right to social security 2008-02-04, UN doc E/C 12/GC/19
para 78 (the CESCR also recommended that the selection by states of a core group of social risks
and contingencies be done after a wide process of consultation, para 59(a)); CESCR General
Comment no 15 The right to water 2003-01-20, UN doc E/C 12/2002/11 para 56.
17CESCR General Comment no 14 The right to the highest attainable standard of health 2000-08-11,
UN doc E/C 12/2000/4, para 54 (states are also required to provide adolescents with a safe and
supportive environment that ensures the opportunity to participate in decisions affecting their health,
para 23); CESCR General Comment no 15, para 48 (states are also required to give individuals and
groups full and equal access to information concerning water, water services and the environment,
held by public authorities or third parties); CESCR General Comment no 18 The right to work 2006-
02-06, UN doc E/C 12/GC/18, para 42.
18CESCR General Comment no 18 para 42.
19CESCR General Comment no 6 The economic, social and cultural rights of older persons 1995-12-
08, UN doc E/1996/22 paras 5 and 39.
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to a general satisfactory environment favourable to one’s development) of the
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights require states to provide
‘meaningful opportunities for individuals to be heard and to participate in the
development decisions affecting their communities’.20 It has found informing
community members of an impending project as a fait accompli, not giving them
an opportunity to shape the policies or their role in it, and failing to provide full
information resulting in community representatives being in unequal bargaining
power, not to constitute effective participation.21
2.2 South African law and meaningful engagement
The legal basis for meaningful engagement can also be found in the Constitution
and other pieces of legislation and policies on specific rights as well as on local
government. This section focuses on housing legislation and policies.22
 
2.2.1 The Constitution
The duty to engage meaningfully is located within certain constitutional provisions.23
First, section 152 of the Constitution obliges local government to ‘ensure the
provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner’,24 ‘promote social and
economic development’,25 and to ‘encourage the involvement of communities and
community organisations in the matters of local government’.26 This duty is also
located within the state’s duty to ‘improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the
potential of each person’ contained in the Preamble to the Constitution; the
government’s obligation to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of
Rights provided in section 7(2) of the Constitution; the right to dignity in section 10
of the Constitution; and the right to life in section 11 of the Constitution. A municipality
that ejects people from their homes without first meaningfully engaging with them
would therefore be acting in a manner that is broadly at odds with the spirit and
purpose of these constitutional obligations.27 
20The Social and Economic Rights Action Centre and the Centre for Economic and Social Rights v
Nigeria Communication 155/96 (2001) African Human Rights Law Reports 60 (ACHPR 2001) para 53. 
21Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf
of Endorois Welfare Council v Kenya, Communication 276/2003 (ACHPR 2010) [unreported] paras
281 and 282. The Commission found the failure to guarantee effective and meaningful participation
of communities in projects that affect them to constitute a violation of the right to development as
well as the right to property (see paras 228, 241, 283 and 289).
22It is important to note that there is also the National Framework for Participation 2007, which is a
policy framework for public participation in South Africa.
23See Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road v City of Johannesburg 2008 5 BCLR 475 (CC) para 16 (hereafter




27See Olivia Road (n 23) para 16.
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Meaningful engagement is further grounded in the government’s obligation
to act reasonably when adopting and implementing measures aimed at the
progressive realisation of socio-economic rights.28 Every step that the government
takes must be consistent with this obligation.29 Thus, for a measure to be
reasonable, it would have to be ascertained whether meaningful engagement had
taken placed, as explained further in the subsequent section of this article dealing
with the relevant jurisprudence.30 
In addition, section 195 of the Constitution lays down basic values and
principles that must govern public administration. It provides that public
administration must be governed by democratic values and principles contained
in the Constitution, including encouraging the public to participate in policy making
and providing the public with timely, accessible and accurate information.31
Section 195 is thus one of the bases of meaningful engagement.
Also, section 33 of the Constitution requires government to respect
procedural fairness when taking any administrative action. Government decisions
to evict and relocate people, for instance, would amount to an administrative
action and must therefore be lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair. Section 33
of the Constitution has been fleshed out in sections 3 and 4 of the Promotion of
Administrative Justice Act,32 which place further duties on administrators generally
and sets out the manner in which administrators are to fulfil their constitutional
obligations when implementing legislation and policies. The sections give
important guidance on the nature of the duty to engage. For example, section 4
speaks to the holding of a public inquiry and a proper consideration of the inputs
received. Sections 3 and 4 of PAJA are aimed at ensuring a proportional balance
of competing interests; implying that the effect of an administrative action has to
be balanced against the need to take measures aimed at realising socio-
economic rights.33 Generally, the procedural fairness requirements would facilitate
rational and accurate decision making in the provision of socio-economic goods
and services, as it provides an opportunity for the voices of individuals and
communities to be heard before final decisions are made.
28This obligation is stated in, eg, ss 26(2) and 27(2) of the Constitution.
29Grootboom (n 9) para 82.
30See Olivia Road (n 23) para 17; Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha
Homes 2009 9 BCLR 847 (CC), para 378 (hereafter Joe Slovo); and Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg
2010 3 BCLR 239 (CC) paras 133 and 134 (hereafter Mazibuko). Reasonable engagement was
considered in these cases in determining the reasonableness of the government’s measure towards
the realisation of the socio-economic rights in question.
31Sections 195(1)(e) and (g).
32Act 3 of 2000 (hereafter PAJA).
33Quinot ‘An administrative law perspective on “bad building” evictions in the Johannesburg inner
city’ (2006) 8/1 ESR Review 25 at 27.
(2011) 26 SAPL136
2.2.2 Housing legislation
The key legislation in this area is the Housing Act,34 which obliges all spheres of
government – national, provincial and local – to ‘consult meaningfully with
individuals and communities affected by housing development’ and ‘facilitate
active participation of all relevant stakeholders in housing development’.35
Meaningful engagement is also an important requirement when evictions are
sought under the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of
Land Act,36 which spells out a number of procedural standards to be followed
when evicting unlawful occupiers. Meaningful engagement is mandated for all
evictions under the PIE Act.37 The nature of the competing interests involved in
eviction proceedings under the PIE Act would make it not just and equitable to
order an eviction if proper discussions, and where appropriate, mediation, have
not been attempted.38
With regard to policy measures in the area of housing, the White Paper on
Housing,39 which is aimed at guiding government’s housing policy, and the
National Housing Code,40 containing guidelines in respect of housing policy,
requires that government housing policies and strategies place specific emphasis
on promoting the effective participation of affected communities in the planning
and implementation of housing developments. Other policy measures such as the
Comprehensive Plan on Sustainable Human Settlements, commonly referred to
as ‘Breaking New Ground in Housing Delivery’ (BNG), see consultation and
community participation as a key component of housing development.41 The
Social Housing Policy for South Africa requires participation by beneficiaries in the
administration and management of their housing options and further expects
social housing institutions to consult with residents through meaningful
participation.42
34Act 107 of 1997.
35Section 2(1)(l) of the Housing Act. See also s 9(2)(a).
36Act 19 of 1998 (hereafter PIE Act).
37This was confirmed by the Constitutional Court in Abahlali Basemjondolo Movement SA v Premier
of KwaZulu-Natal 2009 4 BCLR 422 (CC) para 69 (hereafter Abahlali).
38See Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2004 12 BCLR 1268 (CC) para 43 (hereafter
PE Municipality).
39National Department of Housing White Paper: A New Housing Policy and Strategy for South Africa
(1994) http://www.housing.gov.za/Content/planned/Docs/Housing%20White%20Paper.pdf>.
40Section 4. Adopted in 2000 http://www.housing.gov.za. A new Housing Code is currently awaiting
Ministerial approval.
41National Department of Housing Breaking New Ground: A comprehensive plan for the development
of sustainable human settlements (2004) http://www.capegateway.gov.za/Text/2007/10/bng.pdf. 
42National Department of Housing A social housing policy for South Africa: Towards an enabling
environment for social housing development (2003) http://www.housing.gov.za/Content/legislation
_policies/Social%20Housing%20Policy.pdf. 
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2.2.3 Local government legislation
The Local Government: Municipal Structures Act43 requires a municipal council
to annually review its processes for community involvement and must develop
mechanisms to consult the community and community organisations in performing
its functions and exercising its powers.44 The Local Government: Municipal
Systems Act45 is more extensive, devoting its chapter 4 to community
participation. Local government is required to ‘encourage, and create conditions
for, the local community to participate in the affairs of the municipality’, including
in relation to the provision of services;46 contribute to building the capacity of local
communities to enable them participate in the affairs of the municipality;47 and to
use its resources and annually allocate funds in its budget for the purpose of
fostering participation.48 A municipality is obliged to establish appropriate
mechanisms, processes and procedures to enable the local community to
participate in the affairs of the municipality, including providing for public meetings
and hearings, consultative sessions and report-back to the local community.49 In
doing this, the municipality must take into account the special needs of
disadvantaged groups, including people who cannot read or write, people with
disabilities, and women.50 Communication of information concerning community
participation must be done in a manner that takes into account language
preferences and the special needs of people.51 The Council of a municipality is
required to encourage involvement of the local community and consult the local
community on ‘the level, quality, range and impact of municipal services provided
by the municipality, either directly or through another service provider’ and ‘the
available options for service delivery’.52 Members of a community have the rights
to contribute to the decision-making processes of the municipality, to submit
written or oral recommendations, representations and complaints to the municipal
council or another political structure, to prompt responses to their written or oral
communications, to be informed of the decisions of the council affecting their
rights, and to demand that proceedings be open to the public.53
43Act 117 of 1998.
44Sections 19(2) and (3).








53Sections 5(1)(a), (b),(c) and (e).
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3 The courts and meaningful engagement
3.1 The engagement cases
The Constitutional Court and some lower courts have made very important points
about meaningful engagement and its importance in the realisation of socio-
economic rights, particularly in the context of the right to adequate housing. This
section focuses largely on the decisions of the Constitutional Court. However,
reference is also made to relevant lower court decisions. 
The Constitutional Court first made reference to engagement in Grootboom,
the first case in which it enforced the right of access to adequate housing. This
case concerned a group of children and adults who had been evicted from private
land, and while camping on a sports field, they approached the courts to enforce
their right of access to adequate housing. The Constitutional Court held that in
reviewing compliance with the state’s positive obligation to progressively realise
the right of access to housing within available resources, a court will consider
whether the measures taken towards this end are reasonable.54 The Court found
the state’s housing programme not to be reasonable as it did not make
reasonable provision for those in desperate need of housing – those with no roof
over their head, no access to land, and who are living in intolerable conditions or
crisis situations. The Court ordered the state to adopt, implement and supervise
a comprehensive and coordinated programme that addresses effectively the
situation of those desperately in need of housing.55 Regarding the children, the
Court held that the primary obligation to provide for children’s needs lies with their
parents and on the state only when such children have been removed from the
care of parents.56
With regard to meaningful engagement, the Court held that it expected
officials of a municipality responsible for housing to engage with people as soon
as they became aware of their (illegal) occupation of land. It then expressed
disappointment at the failure of the municipality to make some effort to resolve the
problems faced by the residents on a case-by-case basis following an
investigation of their circumstances.57 
54For a measure to be reasonable, the Court held, it must be comprehensive, coherent, inclusive,
balanced, flexible, transparent, properly conceived and properly implemented, and make short-,
medium- and long-term provision for those in desperate need or in crisis situations. The measures
must further clearly set out the responsibilities of the different spheres of government and ensure
that financial and human resources are available for their implementation (Grootboom (n 9) paras
37 and 41-43).
55Grootboom (n 9) para 99.
56Grootboom (n 9) paras 73-74 and 77-78. As the children in this case were under the care of their
parents or families, the Court further decided that the state must provide the legal and administrative
infrastructure necessary to ensure that children are given the protection intended by s 28 of the
Constitution, dealing with, amongst others, children’s right to shelter.
57Grootboom (n 9) para 87.
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In its subsequent decision in Minister of Public Works v Kyalami Ridge
Environmental Association,58 the Constitutional Court also made some important
points regarding engagement. This case involved the government’s decision to
house people who had been displaced by severe floods. The government’s plan
was to establish a transit camp on state-owned land, with the aim of moving the
people to permanent housing once it becomes available.59 The Constitutional Court
relied on section 26 of the Constitution, on the right to have access to adequate
housing, to justify the government’s action. It stated that in terms of this right, the
national government had the duty to ensure that laws, policies, programmes and
strategies were adequate to meet the state’s obligation to provide access to
adequate housing. The Court held with reference to Grootboom, that this obligation
included the need to facilitate access to temporary relief for people who were living
in intolerable conditions and for people who were in crisis due to such natural
disasters as floods and fires, or because their homes were under threat of
demolition.60 The Court, therefore, found the government’s decision to be lawful, as
it was intended to give effect to its constitutional obligations.
On engagement, the Court was of the view that principles of good
government include finding an appropriate method to inform affected persons of
its plans and engaging them in discussion and planning at an early stage of a
project.61 The Court, however, did not find the absence of such consultation and
engagement to amount to an invalidation of the government’s decision, as the
government was merely fulfilling its constitutional obligation and would in effect
inhibit the government from taking a decision that had to be taken urgently.62
The Constitutional Court elaborated on engagement in PE Municipality but
did not properly define the process. This case related to an eviction application
by the Port Elizabeth Municipality against a group of adults and children, who had
illegally occupied private undeveloped land within the municipality’s jurisdiction.
The application was based on section 6 of the PIE Act, which allows an organ of
state to institute proceedings for the eviction of an unlawful occupier within its
area of jurisdiction.63 The Court found that the municipality was obliged to provide
alternative accommodation or land prior to an eviction.64 It was of the view that the
state has to take reasonable steps to get an agreed mediated solution and to
provide suitable alternative accommodation particularly for vulnerable groups
such as the elderly, children, disabled persons and female-headed households.65
582001 3 SA1151 (CC) (hereafter Kyalami Ridge).
59Id paras 3-4.
60Id paras 38-40, 
61Id para 111.
62Id paras 110 and 111.
63PE Municipality (n 38) paras 1-2.
64Id paras 29-30, 39-47 and 56-59.
65Id paras 30 and 61.
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Thus evictions cannot proceed without a proper relocation plan based on genuine
consultation.
The Court found the municipality’s lack of engagement in any discussions
with the occupiers, in order to identify their particular circumstances or needs, to
be at odds with its constitutional obligations.66 It held that:
In seeking to resolve the above contradictions, the procedural and substantive
aspects of justice and equity cannot always be separated. The managerial role of
the courts may need to find expression in innovative ways. Thus one potentially
dignified and effective mode of achieving sustainable reconciliations of the
different interests involved is to encourage and require the parties to engage with
each other in a pro-active and honest endeavour to find mutually acceptable
solutions. Wherever possible, respectful face-to-face engagement or mediation
through a third party should replace arms-length combat by intransigent
opponents.67
The Court added that the obligation to engage lies in participation in the
process and not in reaching a settlement.68 The Court went on to describe the
benefits of engagement, which include a reduction in the costs of litigation,
decreasing tensions, narrowing the areas of dispute and ‘facilitating mutual give-
and-take’.69 The engagement process also ‘enables parties to relate to each other
in pragmatic and sensible ways, building up prospects of respectful good
neighbourliness for the future’.70 The Court thus held that ‘a court involved in
future litigation involving occupiers should be reluctant to accept that it would be
just and equitable to order their eviction if it is not satisfied that all reasonable
steps had been taken to get an agreed, mediated solution’.71 The Court further
observed that respectful face-to-face engagement or mediation processes are
useful in facilitating an outcome that ends a stand-off, promotes respect for
human dignity and underlines the fact that we all live in a shared society.72
Meaningful engagement has also been seen as an expression of people’s
dignity in Olivia Road. This is the leading case on meaningful engagement, as it
is where the Constitutional Court first properly defined the concept. The Court also
goes a step further by developing meaningful engagement as a remedy, thus
taking the responsibility to forge innovative remedies to heart.73 The Olivia Road







73The Constitution gives courts wide remedial powers to grant appropriate and effective remedies
in socio-economic rights cases. They may grant ‘appropriate relief, including a declaration of rights’
(s 38), and when deciding a constitutional matter, ‘must declare that any law or conduct that is
inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid to the extent of its inconsistency’ and ‘may make any
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case was a challenge of several aspects of the City of Johannesburg’s (the City)
practice of evicting residents of so called ‘bad’ buildings for health and safety
reasons. At the core of the case were the provisions of the National Building
Regulations and Building Standards Act74 that empower local authorities to issue
a notice to occupiers to vacate premises when they deem it necessary for the
safety of any person.75 Failure to comply with such a notice constitutes a criminal
offence for which the offender can be fined up to R100 for each day of non-
compliance.76 After hearing the case, but before handing down judgment as is
ordinarily the case, the Constitutional Court issued an interim order. The order
required the parties to ‘engage with each other meaningfully’ in an attempt to
resolve the issues in the application and alleviating the plight of the occupiers by
making the buildings as safe and conducive to habitation as was reasonably
practicable; and report back to the Court. The interim order reads:
1 The City of Johannesburg and the applicants are required to engage with each
other meaningfully and as soon as it is possible for them to do so, in an effort
to resolve the differences and difficulties aired in this application in the light of
the values of the Constitution, the constitutional and statutory duties of the
municipality and the rights and duties of citizens concerned.
2 The City of Johannesburg and the applicants must also engage with each
other in an effort to alleviate the plight of the applicants who live in the two
buildings concerned in this application by making the buildings as safe and as
conducive to health as is reasonably practicable.
3 The City of Johannesburg and the applicants must file affidavits before this
Court on or before 3 October 2007 reporting on the results of the engagement
between the parties as at 27 September 2007.77 
In line with its view in PE Municipality, the Constitutional Court observed that it
would be inappropriate to grant any eviction order against the occupiers, in the
circumstances of this case, unless there had at least been some effort at meaningful
engagement.78 The Court subsequently handed down judgment after the parties had
reached a settlement and submitted it to the Court.79 The Court endorsed the
order that is just and equitable’ (s 172(1) emphasis added). The courts thus have the responsibility
to ‘forge new tools’ and shape innovative remedies, if needs be, to achieve this goal (see Fose v
Minister of Safety and Security 1997 7 BCLR 851 (CC) para 69 (hereafter Fose)).
74Act 103 of 1977 (hereafter NBRSA).
75Section 12(4)(b) of the NBRSA.
76Section 12(6) of the NBRSA. The Constitutional Court found this automatic criminal sanction
attaching to a failure to comply with a s 12(4)(b) notice to be at odds with s 26(3) of the Constitution
which prohibits arbitrary evictions (Olivia Road (n 23) para 49). The Court then read words into the
act to allow for judicial oversight in the eviction of people in terms of the NBRSA (Olivia Road (n 23)
paras 54, and 47-51).
77Interim Order, dated 2007-080-30, reproduced in Olivia Road (n 23) para 5. 
78Olivia Road (n 23) para 22. 
79Agreement, signed on 2007-10-29, referred to in Olivia Road (n 23) paras 24-26.
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settlement agreement on the basis that it represented a reasonable response to the
engagement process.80 The Court recalled its position in Grootboom that reasonable
state action implies that human beings be treated with respect and care for their
dignity.81 In defining meaningful engagement, the Court held that ‘[e]ngagement is
a two-way process in which the City and those about to become homeless would talk
to each other meaningfully in order to achieve certain objectives’.82 The City should
have thus engaged meaningfully with the occupiers both individually and collectively
as a minimum requirement, as it ought to have been aware of the possibility, or even
the probability, that people would become homeless as a direct result of their eviction
at its instance.83 The Court went further to spell out the objectives of such
engagement, while emphasising that there is no closed list of the objectives. It would
be to: ascertain what the consequences of the eviction might be; whether the City
could help in alleviating the situation of those in dire need; whether it was possible
to render the buildings concerned relatively safe and conducive to health for an
interim period; whether the City had any obligations to the occupiers in the prevailing
circumstances; and when and how the City could or would fulfil these obligations.84
The Court also clarified the constitutional basis for meaningful engagement
as stated earlier in this article, which included section 26(2) of the Constitution,
on the government’s obligation to adopt reasonable measures aimed at the
progressive realisation of the right to have access to adequate housing.85 Though
the Court’s decision was not based on the reasonableness test developed in
Grootboom, by citing section 26(2) as one of the bases for meaningful
engagement, the Court thus, it is argued, grounds the engagement process in the
reasonableness concept and expands the reasonableness criteria to include
meaningful or reasonable engagement in the context of an eviction. This
argument is supported by later decisions of the Court, explained below.
The Court further made other important new points about the engagement
process. The Court held that:
80The agreement contained interim measures to secure the safety of the building and provide the
occupiers with alternative accommodation in the inner City of Johannesburg. The interim measures to
improve the conditions in the two buildings pending relocation to the alternative accommodation
included the provision, at the City’s expense, of toilets, potable water, waste disposal services, fire
extinguishers and a once-off operation to clean and sanitise the properties. The City and the occupiers
agreed that the alternative accommodation would consist of, at least, security against eviction, access
to sanitation, access to potable water, and access to electricity for heating, lighting and cooking. It was
further agreed that, once relocated, the occupiers would occupy the temporary shelter until suitable
permanent housing solutions were developed for them. It was also agreed that the nature and location
of permanent housing options would be developed by the City in consultation with the occupiers.
81Olivia Road (n 23) paras 10-11.
82Id para 14.
83Id para 13. 
84Id para 14.
85Id paras 16-18.
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[T]he larger the number of people potentially to be affected by eviction, the greater
the need for structured, consistent and careful engagement. Ad hoc engagement
may be appropriate in a small municipality where an eviction or two might occur
each year, but is entirely inappropriate in the circumstances prevalent in the City.86
Engagement must thus be tailored to the particular circumstances of each
situation and be done both individually and collectively. The Court added that it ‘must
be understood that the process of engagement will work only if both sides act
reasonably and in good faith’.87 In this regard, Ray has observed that there is always
the possibility that a municipality will decide to engage in bad faith either through
refusing to engage or it could go through the engagement without offering any serious
concessions to residents and without seriously justifying that refusal beyond simply
saying it lacks the resources.88 He suggests, and rightly so, that in such cases, the
court could order further engagement with additional court control and find the
government liable for violation of the constitutional rights on procedural grounds.89
Whether this would in fact work when the political will is completely absent remains
to be seen. In the case of Mamba v Minister of Social Development,90 concerning the
closure of camps that housed refugees from the recent xenophobic violence in South
Africa, the provincial government was, however, not willing to engage meaningfully,
proceeding with closure of the camps without consultation on a reintegration plan.
Further attempts by the Court to force the engagement were futile. The Constitutional
Court in this case had directed the parties ‘to engage with each other meaningfully
and with all other stakeholders as soon as it is possible for them to do so in order to
resolve the differences and difficulties aired in this application in the light of the values
of the Constitution, the constitutional and statutory obligations of the respondents and
the rights and duties of the residents of the shelters’.91 
The Constitutional Court in Olivia Road further held that:
[S]ecrecy is counter-productive to the process of engagement. The constitutional
value of openness is inimical to secrecy … the provision of a complete and
accurate account of the process of engagement including at least the reasonable
efforts of the municipality within that process would ordinarily be essential. 92
The requirement of making the process public is crucial as it makes room for
interested individuals or groups to appraise the process and the result of the
engagement. With regard to the involvement of other stakeholders in the process,
the Court stated that the engagement process should preferably be managed by
86Id para 19.
87Id para 20.
88Ray Extending the shadow of the law; Using hybrid mechanisms to develop constitutional norms
in socioeconomic rights cases Working Paper 21: Centre for Human and Global Justice (2008) 35.
89Ibid.
90CCT65/08 (hereafter Mamba). The case was subsequently withdrawn as it had become moot.
91Id Court Order dated 2008-08-21 para 1.
92Olivia Road (n 23) para 21.
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careful and sensitive people on its side so as to ensure that a municipality is able to
engage meaningfully with poor, vulnerable or illiterate people.93 Structures that are
staffed by competent and sensitive council workers who are skilled in engagement
have to be put in place.94 The Court added that ‘civil society organisations that
support the peoples’ claims should preferably facilitate the engagement process in
every possible way’.95 The Constitutional Court also recognised the importance of
involving other role players in the engagement process in the Mamba case, where
as stated above, the Constitutional Court required the parties to engage with each
other meaningfully and with all other stakeholders.96 
Involving other stakeholders in the meaningful engagement process is in line
with South Africa’s democracy as envisioned in the Constitution. The Constitutional
Court has explained the kind of democracy envisioned in the Constitution in Doctors
for Life International v The Speakers of the National Assembly.97 This case related
to the role of the public in the law-making process. It concerned the constitutionality
of four Bills related to health issues, on the ground of the failure of parliament to fulfil
its constitutional obligation to facilitate public involvement when it passed the Bills.98
The Constitutional Court held that a defining feature of the democracy that is
contemplated in the Constitution is one that is not only representative but also
contains participatory elements.99 The Court added that the foundation of
representative democracy would be meaningless without public participation and
‘participation by the public on a continuous basis provides vitality to the functioning
of representative democracy’.100 The Court in Doctors for Life thus emphasised the
government’s obligation to ensure that the public effectively participates in
legislative processes.101 It saw this duty as a manifestation of the right to political
participation in international law and of importance to the achievement of
constitutional values and goals.102 The Court then held that ‘the obligation to
facilitate public involvement is a material part of the law-making process’ and that
‘[f]ailure to comply with this obligation renders the resulting legislation invalid’.103 
The participatory democracy envision in the Constitution has also been
explained in Minister of Health v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd.104 This case




96Mamba (n 90) para 1.
972006 12 BCLR 1399 paras 111 and 116 (hereafter Doctors for Life).
98Id paras 1-2.





1042006 8 BCLR 872 (CC) paras 111, 625 and 627 (hereafter New Clicks).
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a pricing system for medicines and Scheduled substances published by the
Minister of Health. The Court underscored the importance of people to have a say
in what the government is doing.105 It held that:
Because transparency and responsiveness relate more to the broad character of
the workings of our democracy than to doing justice to an individual, all interested
parties, not only those whose rights stand to be adversely affected, are entitled to
know what government is doing, and as concerned citizens, to have an
appropriate say.106
The Court’s approach of involving other stakeholders in the remedial process
and making the process public mirrors other remedial models that speak to
participation of those affected in the remedy formulation process. For instance, the
‘experimentalist’ approach of remedial decision making by Sabel and Simon is a
deliberative process that allows for on-going stakeholder participation. The
stakeholders are expected to listen to each other in good faith and remain open to
learning. It further requires that the policies, norms and results of the process be
transparent, that is made public.107 The process can thus enhance democratic
accountability to diverse stakeholders since transparency is an accountability norm.
Also, Sturm’s ‘deliberative model of remedial decision making’ speaks to the
participation of other stakeholders that might be responsible for or affected by the
remedial outcome.108 Mbazira has, however, cautioned against diluting the remedial
process or unnecessarily slowing it down through wide stakeholder participation to
the extent that remediation is lost.109
105Id para 607.
106Id para 627.
107Sabel and Simon ‘Destabilization rights: How public litigation succeeds’ (2004) 117 Harvard LR
1015 at 1067-1072. The experimentalist approach tries to get as many stakeholders as possible
involved in the determination of an appropriate solution, not just the parties to the case. With this
approach, the parties first come together to negotiate a remedial plan, with the goal of consensus,
and other interested stakeholders can join. The court may appoint a mediator and the stakeholders
meet in person. The rules that emerge from this remedial negotiation stage are provisional as they
are continuously reassessed and revised during the negotiation process. The policies, norms and
results must be transparent, that is, made public.
108Sturm ‘A normative theory of public law remedies’ (1991) 79 Georgetown LJ 1355 at 1427-1431
and 1433. With the deliberative model of remedial decision-making, the stakeholders are not limited
to the parties but include others that might be responsible for or affected by the remedial outcome.
With this approach, the mediation process begins with the court determining liability and then setting
up a mediation process, which has three stages – pre-negotiation, negotiation, and implementation.
In the pre-negotiation stage, the judge performs several functions including assisting in identifying
stakeholders and a mediator and outlining the characteristics of the process by which they are to
attempt to craft a remedy. If consensus is reached, the agreement is then presented to the court,
which then holds a public hearing on the proposed remedy, evaluates the adequacy of the remedy,
and then issues an opinion.
109Mbazira Litigating socio-economic rights in South Africa: A choice between corrective and
distributive justice (2009) 217.
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It is worth noting also that meaningful engagement as a remedy in Olivia
Road further surmounts concerns around the separation of powers and issues of
polycentricity in socio-economic rights adjudication, giving the government some
leeway in policy-decision making, while embracing other democratic principles
such as transparency and accountability. Similarly, Brand has stated that
meaningful engagement ‘holds great promise, both because it potentially resolves
the problems of institutional capacity and institutional relations attaching to
remedies in socio-economic rights cases … and because it provides a mechanism
for the powerful legitimation by courts of transformative political action’.110
Despite the progressive points made on meaningful engagement in Olivia Road,
the Constitutional Court, in the Joe Slovo case, found that the defective engagement
processes in the case did not vitiate the decisions taken by the government. This
case concerned the eviction of a large informal settlement community to make way
for formal housing under the government’s housing development project. While
ordering the eviction of the community, the Constitutional Court emphasised the
obligation of the state to provide alternative accommodation, which is derived from
Grootboom, PE Municipality and subsequent cases.111 The Court was prescriptive
as regards the nature of the alternative accommodation to be provided, providing
detailed standards that the accommodation must comply with. It also emphasised the
obligation on states to engage meaningfully with communities faced with eviction and
was specific as to the issues to be included in such an engagement.112
Despite its misgivings about the engagement process that took place prior to the
litigation – finding serious faults and inadequacies in the process - the Court went
ahead to order the mass eviction. The Court did not see in-situ upgrading of the Joe
Slovo settlement as feasible, and thus ordered the mass eviction of the community
in accordance with a time table provided by the government.113 It ordered
engagement as one of the mitigating aspects to render the eviction ‘just and
equitable’.114 The Court ordered the eviction despite the flawed engagement on the
basis that the beneficial ends of low-income housing development had to be
considered when condemning this ‘deplored’ deficiency.115 Yacoob J, while finding
that there had been reasonable engagement, stated that:
It is certainly true that the state could and should have been more alive to the human
factor and that more intensive consultation could have prevented the impasse that had
resulted. Having given these issues careful consideration, I do not think that these
factors in themselves are sufficient to tilt the scale against eviction and relocation.116
110Brand Courts, socio-economic rights and transformative politics LLD thesis UN (Stellenbosch)
(2009) 137.
111Joe Slovo (n 30) para 7.
112Id paras 5 and 7. 
113Id para 7.
114Id para 7(10).
115Id paras 112, 113, 117, 167, 301, 302, 280 and 284.
116Id para 113.
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Moseneke J, on the other hand, did not find the engagement that took place
to be reasonable.117 O’Regan J noted the government’s acknowledgement that
there was not a coherent or adequate process of consultation and its failure to
engage fully and meaningfully with the occupiers and others affected by the
housing development but that such failure does not render the implementation of
the project unreasonable, considering the extent of inadequate housing and the
attempts being made to deal with this crisis.118 
Sachs J also found serious faults with the engagement process noting that
‘[t]he evidence suggests the frequent employment of a top-down approach where
the purpose of reporting back to the community was seen as being to pass on
information about decisions already taken rather than to involve the residents as
partners in the process of decision-making itself’.119 He, however, held that the
inadequacies do not necessarily nullify the whole process, as what matters is the
overall adequacy of the scheme as it unfolded.120
The Court was thus willing to condone the inadequate consultation processes
merely on the basis that the objectives of the housing development project in
question outweighed the defects in the consultation process. In this regard,
Liebenberg has observed, and rightly so, that the willingness to condone inadequate
engagement processes would result in South Africa’s socio-economic rights
jurisprudence failing to foster the values of participatory democracy that lie at the
heart of transformative developmental processes.121 The top-down engagement that
had taken place was contrary to the Court’s view in Olivia Road that engagement
should be structured and consistent. By condoning the flawed engagement, the
Court failed to take seriously its own insight that procedure and substance are
inextricably linked.122 Liebenberg has further pointed out that unless the courts are
serious about ensuring that meaningful engagement does not become a
meaningless cliché, the realisation of socio-economic rights in South Africa will
exhibit all the flaws of a top-down approach in which the intended beneficiaries have
little say in development or in determining the nature of what is delivered to them.123 
Despite endorsing inadequate engagement processes, the Court provided a
detailed engagement order including a range of issues on which the government is
required to effectively consult on, which it pointed out were not exhaustive.124 These
included: ascertaining the names, details and relevant personal circumstances of
117Id paras 166-167.
118Id paras 301-302 and 304.
119Id para 378.
120Id paras 379-380.
121Liebenberg Socio-economic rights adjudication under a transformative constitution (2010) 309-310
122Id 309.
123Liebenberg ‘Joe Slovo eviction: Vulnerable community feels the law from the top down’ (2009) 22
June Business Day http://www.businessday.co.za/articles/Content.aspx?id=73812. 
124Joe Slovo (n 30) paras 5 and 7(11).
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those who are to be affected by each relocation; the exact time, manner and
conditions under which the relocation of each affected household will be conducted;
the precise temporary residential accommodation units to be allocated to those
persons to be relocated; transport for those to be relocated; transport for their
possessions; transport facilities from the temporary residential accommodation units
to amenities, including schools, health facilities and places of work; and in due
course, permanent housing to those relocated to temporary residential accommo-
dation units, including information on the resident’s current position on the housing
waiting list, and the provision of assistance to those relocated with the completion
of application forms for housing subsidies.125
The Court also reiterated some points on meaningful engagement contained
in its previous jurisprudence. Similar to its position in Olivia Road, it observed that: 
[t]he requirement of engagement flows from the need to treat residents with
respect and care for their dignity ... individual engagement shows respect and
care for the dignity of the individuals. It enables the government to understand the
needs and concerns of individual households so that, where possible, it can take
steps to meet their concerns.126 
In line with its decision in PE Municipality, the Court held that ‘[m]utual
understanding and accommodation of each others’ concerns, as opposed to
reaching an agreement, should be the primary focus of meaningful engagement’.127
The requirement of good faith in the process, stated in its previous jurisprudence,
was also emphasised in the Joe Slovo case, where the Court held:
What must be stressed, however, is that the process of engagement does not
require the parties to agree on every issue. What is required is good faith and
reasonableness on both sides and the willingness to listen and understand the
concerns of the other side. The goal of meaningful engagement is to find a
mutually acceptable solution to the difficult issues confronting the government and
the residents in the quest to provide adequate housing. This can only be achieved
if all sides approach the process in good faith and a willingness to listen and,
where possible, to accommodate one another.128
The Court further grounds meaningful engagement in the reasonableness
concept, by considering it in its determination of whether an eviction was a
reasonable measure to facilitate the government’s housing development
programme. It held that meaningful engagement between authorities and those
who may become homeless as a result of government activity is vital to the





129Id para 378. 
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It should be noted that the Constitutional Court subsequently issued an order
suspending the evictions of the Joe Slovo residents, based on the government’s
concern that the relocation might end up costing more than upgrading of the Joe
Slovo settlement and the lack of a plan to accommodate those who would not
benefit from the new houses. Recently, the Court issued another judgment
discharging the eviction order since the government had taken no adequate steps
to carry it out; and the circumstances on which it was based have ceased to exist.
The government’s intention had shifted to undertaking an in-situ upgrade instead.
There had also been little or no engagement in relation to the relocation process
and possibility of any future engagement on the relocation was unlikely.130
The Constitutional Court has also considered adequate public consultation
in determining the reasonableness of pre-paid water meters (PPMs) and the City
of Johannesburg’s free basic water (FBW) policy in the Mazibuko case.131 This
case concerned the sufficiency of the City of Johannesburg’s FBW policy and the
lawfulness of PPMs. The High Court and Supreme Court of Appeal in the case
had both found in favour of the applicants, finding PPMs to be unlawful and also
that the 25 litres per person per day water allocation was insufficient. The High
Court found 50 litres of water per person per day to constitute sufficient water in
terms of section 27(1) of the Constitution guaranteeing the right of access to
sufficient water. The Supreme Court of Appeal found 42 litres of water per person
per day to be sufficient. Conversely, the Constitutional Court did not find it
appropriate to give a quantified content to what constitutes ‘sufficient water’
because it is a matter for the government to decide.132
One of the arguments of the applicants in the Mazibuko case in relation to the
unlawfulness of PPMs was that the City failed, as required by section 4 of PAJA,
to hold a public enquiry or a notice and comment procedure before implementing
the decision to introduce PPMs.133 The Constitutional Court did not find the
installation of PPMs to be administrative action that is reviewable under PAJA, but
as an exercise of executive powers to determine how services should be
implemented.134 The Court considered the consultation processes that had taken
place with communities, as stated in the City of Johannesburg’s argument to this
effect, in determining the reasonableness of the City’s water policies. The Court
then noted that there were extensive consultation processes held through formal
structures representing the community, particularly ward committees and
130See Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2011 ZACC 8,
Judgment handed down on 2011-03-31.
131Mazibuko (n 30) paras 133 and 134. For a discussion of this case, see Liebenberg (n 121) 466-
480. See also Heleba ‘The right of access to sufficient water and the Constitutional Court’s judgment
in Mazibuko’ (2009) 10/4 ESR Review 12.




meetings held by ward councillors on the extent of the policies and how they
would be implemented.135 In making this ruling, the Court disregarded the
applicant’s argument, which the High Court accepted, that there was no
consultation prior to the making of the decision. The High Court had found that the
affected individuals were not given adequate notice, were not advised of their
legal rights and were not given information as to the available remedies, which
was procedurally unfair and rendered the consultation inadequate.136
In the Abahlali137 case, a constitutional challenge to the KwaZulu-Natal
Elimination and Prevention of Re-Emergence of Slums Act,138 the Constitutional
Court again emphasised the importance of meaningful engagement in its
judgment. The Slums Act aimed to eliminate slums in the province of KwaZulu-
Natal and allowed for evictions without meaningful engagement, among other
things. Section 16 of the Act was specifically challenged as it made it compulsory
for municipalities to institute eviction proceedings for eviction of unlawful
occupiers where the owner or person in charge of the land fails to do so within a
time period prescribed by the Member of the Executive Council for Local
Government, Housing and Traditional Affairs (the MEC) of the province of
KwaZulu-Natal. After finding that the provincial government had the competence
to pass the Act,139 the Court found section 16 of the Act to be unconstitutional, as
it gave too much power to the MEC and undermined the protections in section
26(2) of the Constitution read with the PIE Act and other housing legislation.140
The Court found that the compulsion in the Act ‘erodes and considerably
undermines the protections against arbitrary institution of eviction proceedings’.141
It found the power given to the MEC to issue a notice to be ‘overbroad and
irrational’, and thus ‘seriously invasive of the protections against arbitrary
evictions’ in section 26(2) of the Constitution read with the PIE Act and national
housing legislation.142 
The Court’s decision emphasises the importance for those seeking eviction
to engage reasonably with those to be affected before instituting eviction
proceedings, a requirement that is mandated by both the Constitution and the PIE
Act.143 Yacoob J in the minority judgment further observed that ‘[i]f it appears as
a result of the process of engagement, for example, that the property concerned
can be upgraded without the eviction of the unlawful occupiers, the municipality
135Id paras 133 and 167.
136Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg 2008 JOL 21829 (W) paras 121-122.
137For further reading on this case, see Chenwi ‘Housing rights of “slum” dwellers at stake’ (2009)
10 (1) ESR Review 25-28; and Chenwi ‘Slums Act unconstitutional’ (2009) 10 (4) ESR Review 9-12.
138Act 6 of 2007 (KZN Slums Act).
139See Abahlali (n 37) paras 20-40, 97-98 and 100-101. 
140Id paras 112, 116, 118, 122 and 128-129.
141Id para 112.
142Id para 118.
143Id paras 69, 79 and 113-114.
‘Meaningful engagement’ in the realisation of socio-economic rights 151
cannot institute eviction proceedings. This is because it would not be acting
reasonably in the engagement process.’144 The requirement of engagement is
important as it could have a material impact on the question of whether an
eviction is just and equitable and on the issue of whether the eviction is in the
public interest.145
The lower courts have also held that it would not be just and equitable to grant
an eviction where meaningful engagement had not taken place. A case in point is
that of Lingwood Michael v The Unlawful occupiers of R/E of Erf 9 Highlands.146 The
case concerned the rights of unlawful occupiers and the obligations of the state and
property owners in private eviction applications. The High Court noted the necessity
and importance of parties involved in eviction litigation to engage in an endeavour
to achieve mutually acceptable solutions, as stressed in PE Municipality.147 The
purpose of such engagement would also be to achieve the underlying philosophy
of the PIE Act, which is ‘to promote the constitutional vision of a caring society
based on good neighbourliness and shared concern’ and that is in line with the spirit
of ubuntu.148 Since the parties in the case had not engaged in any negotiations or
attempted any mediation, the Court accordingly refused an eviction order and
postponed the matter sine die, and ordered the joinder of the City of Johannesburg
(the Municipality) by virtue of its constitutional and statutory duties and the
commencement of mediation.149 The Court then directed the parties ‘to engage in
mediation in an endeavour to exploring all reasonable possibilities of securing
suitable alternative accommodation or land and/or of achieving solutions mutually
acceptable to the parties’.150
3.2 Post-litigation engagement: Distinguishing the two
approaches
As stated earlier and as illustrated in the foregoing discussions in this article,
meaningful engagement can either be used in the realisation of socio-economic
rights in general or can be used as a remedy where socio-economic rights have
144Id para 69.
145Id para 79.
1462008 3 BCLR 325 (W) (hereafter Lingwood).
147Id paras 33 and 37.
148Id para 37.
149Id para 38.
150Id para 38. With regard to emerging practice on meaningful engagement in the High Courts, see also
Sailing Queen Investments v The Occupants La Colleen Court 2008 6 BCLR 666 (W); Blue Moonlight
Properties v The Occupiers of Saratoga Avenue 2009 1 SA 470 (W); and City of Johannesburg
Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight case no 338/10, 2011 ZASCA 47. These cases highlight the
need for government to assist in resolving disputes through meaningful engagement. They also
underscore the need for individualised assessment of the needs and circumstances of occupiers faced
with evictions – a point that is also accentuated in Olivia Road and Joe Slovo – which I argue can only
be effectively done if the government engages meaningfully with the occupiers.
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been infringed or are threatened. However, two approaches need to be
distinguished when using meaningful engagement as a remedy, once litigation
has commenced. It is important to distinguish the two approaches since they
could have an impact on the outcome of post-litigation engagement and whether
it was in fact meaningful.
As seen from the Constitutional Court’s decisions discussed above,
engagement should ordinarily take place before litigation ‘unless it is not possible
to do so because of urgency or some other compelling reason’.151 However, the
approach of the Court differs as to when engagement should be ordered once
litigation has commenced. The Constitutional Court’s approach in Joe Slovo can
be distinguished from that in Olivia Road in that, in the former, engagement was
ordered before the Court issued its judgment, but with the latter, engagement was
ordered with the judgment. 
The question therefore is whether it is appropriate to order engagement before
or after determining the legal issues? The jurisprudence of the courts does not
provide an answer to this question. I have discussed this question elsewhere but it is
worth restating the points here.152 With the Court’s approach in Olivia Road, the
parties get into the engagement without normative parameters, not knowing their
legitimate entitlements. In Joe Slovo, the parties know their legal entitlements before
getting into the engagement. The Court’s approach in Olivia Road can be
distinguished from Sturm’s deliberative model of remedial decision-making mentioned
above, where the mediation process begins with the court determining liability and
then setting up a mediation process. The Court thus first defines the normative
parameters of the process and the liability norms that have been violated.153 
The Court’s approach in Olivia Road could pose difficulties in that the parties
get into the engagement without knowing their legal entitlements, yet the
inequality in bargaining power between the state and its citizens continues to
exist. This could result in the engagement being unsuccessful or not meaningful,
especially in cases where the poor are not represented by competent lawyers.
First defining the normative parameters of the process and the liability norms that
have been violated prior to the engagement process could be useful in curbing
this power imbalance. The Court should thus be mindful of this power imbalance
when ordering meaningful engagement before issuing a judgment in future cases
and also of the fact that inadequate knowledge impacts negatively on beneficiary
power. It could, however, be argued that the Court, to a limited extent, recognised
this power imbalance concern in Olivia Road when it observed that ‘[i]t will not
always be appropriate for a court to approve all agreements entered into
151Olivia Road (n 23) para 30.
152See Chenwi ‘A new approach to remedies in socioeconomic rights adjudication: Occupiers of 51
Olivia Road and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others’ (2009) 2 Constitutional Court Review
371 at 384-387.
153Sturm (n 108) 1427-1431.
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consequent upon engagement’.154 Brand has argued that meaningful engagement
between the state and occupiers facing eviction only makes sense if it is granted
after at least the legal issues in a case have been decided. This is because:
Parties to a dispute approach a court presumably because they have themselves
been unable to resolve that dispute amicably. They want, and can legitimately
expect the court to determine authoritatively which of their conflicting claims are
valid, so that a practical solution to their dispute can be found on that normative
basis ... Not only does this set the limits within which engagement may operate,
it also, importantly, places the parties to the negotiation, with their rights and
duties now authoritatively determined and with the end goals of the negotiation
clear, on an equal footing.155
Brand also discusses a number of consequences of issuing the meaningful
engagement while the judgment is still pending, including the fact that the parties
had to negotiate without an authoritative indication of their legitimate goals of
engagement and the consequent refusal by the Court to consider certain
issues.156 Another difficulty with regard to ordering engagement while judgment
is still pending, as evidenced from Olivia Road, is that it results in the Court
shifting very important issues to the engagement process that it should have
decided on, thus diminishing the Court’s interpretative role. Despite noting a
number of outstanding issues that remained in dispute following the engagement
process,157 the Court did not proceed to consider them. Instead, the Court did not
find it necessary to consider, for instance, the question of the City of
Johannesburg’s housing plan and policies though the parties had indicated that
they had not been able to reach agreement on the question relating to the City’s
housing plan and policies. The Court hoped that the negotiations would continue
in good faith.158 Ray has argued that the Constitutional Court’s approach in Olivia
Road pushes the responsibility of developing the substantive content of the right
to have access to adequate housing into the political sphere.159 Dugard also
states that the Court’s failure to address the outstanding issues has resulted in a
failure to ‘tackle the policies and practices at the core of the vulnerability of poor
people living in locations earmarked for commercial developments’ and to
‘establish critical rights-based safeguards for extremely vulnerable groupings’.160
154Olivia Road (n 23) para 30.
155Brand (n 110) 162-163. 
156Ibid.
157These included the City’s failure to formulate and implement a housing plan for the occupiers and
other similarly situated persons; the City’s policy in dealing with persons occupying ‘bad’ buildings;
the review of the City’s decisions to issue notices to the occupiers; the applicability of PIE; and the
reach and applicability of ss 26(1), 26(2) and 26(3) of the Constitution. See Olivia Road, para 31.
158Olivia Road (n 23) para 34.
159Ray (n 88) 26.
160Dugard ‘Courts and the poor in South Africa: A critique of systematic failure to advance
transformative justice’ (2008) 24 SAJHR 214-238 237-238.
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Though when engagement should be ordered could impact on the success
of an engagement, the success of the engagement in Olivia Road was largely due
to the fact that the unlawful occupiers were represented by very competent
lawyers and both parties were willing to engage. As illustrated in the Mamba case,
stated above, where there is no political will, engagement becomes challenging.
The Court also attributes the success of the case to the direct pressure it put on
the parties to engage and report back: ‘The deciding factor in this case in my view
was that engagement was ordered by this Court, and the parties had been asked
to report back on the process while the proceedings were pending before it’.161
It is important to contrast the approach in Olivia Road with that in Joe Slovo
where the Constitutional Court ordered engagement in addition to addressing the
legal issues in the case, thus providing the parties with a normative basis for the
engagement. The key question is whether this helped the residents. On the one
hand, it could be argued that determining the resident’s entitlement to 70% of the
new homes to be built and specifying the quality of alternative accommodation to
be provided in addition to ordering meaningful engagement corrects power
imbalances by providing the residents with an authoritative indication of what they
are legitimately entitled to. On the other hand, it could be argued that the
residents would have been better off if meaningful engagement was ordered
before the judgment. This might have created some anxiety on the part of the
state about whether the court will agree to the relocation to Delft and might have
forced the state to explore the possibility of a move to a place closer to Joe Slovo,
as was the case in Olivia Road where the alternative accommodation was
provided within the city. However, the fact that the engagement was ordered in
addition to a determination of substantive issues gives some degree of control to
the parties and can alter the bargaining positions of the parties to the benefit of
the residents. It could be argued that this has in fact been the case as the eviction
order, as stated earlier, was subsequently suspended and then discharged.
Furthermore, looking at the Joe Slovo case, meaningful engagement in the
remedial stage, following the determination of substantive issues, could be useful
in getting civil society involved in monitoring and reporting on the implementation
of supervised eviction orders or structural interdicts, as opposed to limiting the
reporting process just to the government and the Court. 
4 Conclusion
This article has considered the legal and jurisprudential analysis of how the
courts, particularly the Constitutional Court, have developed the notion of
meaningful engagement. It can be used in the process of adopting and
implementing measures to realise these rights or in the remedial stage where
161Olivia Road (n 23) para 30.
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these rights have been infringed or are threatened. The jurisprudence considered
illustrates that meaningful engagement can be vital in the enforcement of socio-
economic rights and the promotion and strengthening of constitutional democracy.
Meaningful engagement recognises the core importance of fostering
participation and gives content to the right of participation by those faced with
violation of their socio-economic rights. It fits into the Constitutional Court’s vision
of the kind of democracy the South African Constitution establishes, and is an
expression of bottom-up participatory democracy. Meaningful engagement is not
only encouraged because it is a legal requirement but also because it would
ensure that development plans and services are more relevant to local needs and
conditions. Engagement would also encourage communities to have control over
their own lives and livelihoods. Ray adds that engagement can be an incentive for
government to develop the kind of multi-faceted and robust housing policies that
section 26 of the Constitution arguably requires.162 Reasonable engagement could
thus be relevant in solving the problems of service delivery and to achieving public
and democratic accountability. 
Furthermore, the laws and cases considered underline a number of principles
and guidelines that are relevant in ensuring that engagement is meaningful.
These include, amongst others: treating communities as partners in decision
making processes; providing complete and accurate accounts of the engagement
process; having a well-structured, coordinated, consistent and comprehensive
process and ensuring accessibility; ensuring that relevant information is
accessible and transparent; approaching the process with openness; and respect
for constitutional rights and values not just in relation to the process but also the
outcome must be consistent with rights and values. The nature and extent of
engagement must also be context-sensitive. The cases further reflect the growing
perception that judicial review can be regarded as a form of ‘dialogue’.163 
By ordering engagement as a remedy, South African courts – the
Constitutional Court in particular – are exercising their remedial powers in such
a way that allow for democratic processes of consultation and dialogue to occur
in the realisation of socio-economic rights. Also, engagement at the remedial
stage, as seen from the Joe Slovo case, could be a useful tool to mitigate the
effects of a negative court ruling. This case, though raising some concerns about
the ease at which the Constitutional Court would condone flawed engagement
processes; on the other hand, it is illustrative of the readiness of the Court to
intervene where the government fails to comply with an engagement order. This
162See, generally, Ray ‘Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road v City of Johannesburg: Enforcing the right to
adequate housing through “engagement”’ (2008) 8 Human Rights LR 703-713.
163See Roach ‘Constitutional, remedial and international dialogues about rights: The Canadian
experience’ (2004) 40 Texas International LJ 537, that refers to a number of cases from the
Canadian Supreme Court and articles by Canadian, US, UK and Australian legal scholars that
support this perception.
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is evidenced from the Court’s recent judgment discharging the eviction order on
the basis that, among other things, there had been little or no engagement and
future engagement is unlikely. Meaningful engagement, if implemented effectively,
would improve and strengthen democratic accountability in the provision of socio-
economic goods and services, which could in turn pave the way for improved
realisation of socio-economic rights and addressing poverty164 in South Africa. 
164Voicelessness and powerlessness are increasingly seen as components of poverty (see Lemanski
(n 2) 395). Meaningful engagement creates a voice for the marginalised and impoverished.
